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Abstract
The paper presents a constructive proof of sufficient conditions
for uniqueness of a homogeneous product Cournot equilibrium. The
result is among the strongest available; in fact if marginal costs cut
demand from below for a feasible output level (and a few other regu-
larity conditions are met) the result provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for uniqueness.

I. INTRODUCTION
There have been a series of results in recent years giving succes-
sively weaker conditions for uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium
(Szidarovszky and Yakowitz, 1977, 1982; Okuguchi, 1983). For the case
of dif f erentiable costs and demands, Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977)
require that costs be convex and demand be concave. This paper serves
to extend this result, using a similar method of proof, but considerably
weakening " requirements on demand and costs. In fact, provided marginal
costs cut demand from below for a feasible output level, and a few
other regularity conditions are met, our result is a necessary and
sufficient condition for uniqueness. The proof presented here is a
constructive one in that the proof could be implemented to find Cournot
equilibria. A nonconstructive proof of the result, based on degree
theory, may be found in Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987).
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let there be N firms each with cost C.(q.) for producing output
q . _> 0. The firms face an aggregate inverse demand function, P(Q)
1
N
ch(where Q = E q.), defined over [0,°°). Profit for the i firm is thus
i = l
l
given by
N
TT.(q) = q.?( E q.) - C.(q.) (1)
j-1 J X
We will assume costs and inverse demand are twice continuously differen-
tiable. Because of differentiability, first order conditions for a
profit maximum for each profit function are:
CP1: Find q such that for all i, 1 < i < N:
q i
-2-
3tt. N N
-±
= C!(q.) - P( E q.) - q.?'( E q.) > 0, (2a)
*i J=l J J=l J
> (2b)
3tt.
q. J^-O (2c)
If profits are concave, then the first order conditions CP1 are necessary
and sufficient for profit maxima and thus solutions to CP1 are precisely
the same as the set of Cournot equilibria.
In order to permit us to restrict attention to a bounded set of out-
puts, we define an upper limit on industry output:
Definit ion : Industry output is said to be bounded if there is a compact
N N
subset, K, of R such that for q e R \ K:
3tt.
- T— (q) > for all i < N. (3)3q
i
For example, industry output is bounded if there is an output level for
which marginal profits are negative for all firms; and furthermore,
these negative marginal profits persist for all greater industry output
levels. This is a common condition which would be met, for instance,
if when the market is flooded with output, price is driven so low that
no firm can maximize profits at a positive output level.
A second requirement is that firms are clearly in the market or out
of the market :
Def ini t ion : For the case where costs and inverse demand are continuously
dif f erent iable, a Cournot equilibrium, q*, is non-degenerate if for all
i < N,
-3-
N
q* = => P( Z q*) - C'(O) < (4)
3-1 J
1
With this definition, it becomes possible to restrict attention to a set
of positive players In the market and be assured that there is a neigh-
borhood of q* in which all Cournot equilibria involve exactly the same
set of players.
III. RESULTS ON UNIQUENESS
We now present the basic results of this paper. We defer a proof
of the results until the next section.
Theorem 1:
Assume costs and inverse demand functions are continuously differen-
tiable and further
i) industry output is bounded
ii) there exists an i e N such that P(0) > C.'(O);
l
iii) profits are quasiconcave with respect to own price (eqn. 3).
Then a nontrivial Cournot equilibrium exists.
The conditions of this theorem are relatively weak. Non-
dif ferentiable functions can be made dif f erentiable by small perturba-
tions. Condition i) is also weak since in most markets, at some large
output level, price necessary to clean the market becomes very small,
less than that necessary for any producer. Condition ii) is necessary
to eliminate the trivial equilibrium of zero output for all producers.
Condition iii) is probably the strongest condition and is necessary to
assure existence of an equilibrium. We now turn to uniqueness:
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Theorem 2:
Assume costs and inverse demand functions are continuously differen-
tiate and further
i) P'(Q+x) < C'.'(x) for all x, Q > 0, i e N; and
ii) all Cournot equilibria, q*, are non-degenerate.
If for all equilibria, q*,
N N
P'( E q*) + q*P"( Z q*)
k=l
K
J k=l
C
,
, ,-.
JSM
CV(q*) " P'( S q*)
2 J k-1
where M = {i |q* > 0},
then there is at most one nontrivial Cournot equilibrium.
The o rem 3 :
Let the assumptions of Theorems 1 and 2 hold. Then, for any
equilibrium, q*,
a) if eqn. (5) holds, the equilibrium is unique;
b) if the equilibrium is unique then eqn. (5) holds except that
the inequality may be an equality.
These results are significant in a number of ways. For the case of
dif f erent iable profit functions and marginal costs cutting demand from
below, these results subsume all previous uniqueness results. Theorem 4
due to Okuguchi (1983) follows trivially as do the earlier results of
Okuguchi (1976) and the results of Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977) and
Murphy et al. (1982). Szidarovszky and Yakowitz's (1977) necessary
condition for uniqueness that inverse demand is downward sloping (P' < 0)
and concave (P" j( 0), is clearly unnecessarily strong.
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Perhaps more significant is that our results need only hold at
equilibria and not globally. Further, we have given necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for uniqueness (excluding equality in eqn. 5), not
just sufficient conditions.
To interpret Theorem 2, consider the simplification that all N firms
are identical. If N is large (or the RHS is set Co zero instead of
one), eqn. (5) basically amounts to
d(MR.)
J
= P'(Q) + q*P"(Q) < 0, i * j (6)dq
i
j
where MR is marginal revenue. When one player (i) increases its out-
put, another player's (j ) marginal revenue declines, and thus player
i's output will tend to decline.
IV. PROOF OF EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS THEOREMS
Since existence of Cournot equilibria for concave profit functions
is a known result, derived from the existence of Nash equilibria for
concave payoffs, our principal contribution is in characterizing con-
ditions for uniqueness. Our results can be seen as a natural exten-
sion of general uniqueness results and in particular, uniqueness
results from Cournot equilibrium theory and complementarity theory
(CP1 above is a complementarity problem).
For some years, the Gale-Nikaido (1965) theorem has been used to
show uniqueness of equilibria, competitive or otherwise. The theorem
states that a function f(x) from one rectangular region to another is
one-to-one if its Jacobian is everywhere a P-matrix; i.e., has positive
principal minors. For the complementarity problem (CP1 above), if the
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Jacobian of the marginal profit functions constitutes a P-matrix then
at most one solution to CP1 exists (Megiddo and Kojima, 1977).
Recently (Dierker, 1972; Mas-Collel, 1979; Kehoe, 1980) have
weakened the P-matrix condition for the general equilibrium problem to
the requirement that the Jacobian have a positive determinant at all
equilibria. This turns out to be a necessary and sufficient condition
for uniqueness of equilibria (subject to some conditions). Since our
eqn. (5) is related to the determinant of the Jacobian of the marginal
profit function, our development is related to theirs. In fact our
result is proved, using degree theory, in Kolstad and Mathiesen (1986).
To sketch our proof, the basic idea is to append to CP1 a constraint
N
that S q. = Q. As Q is varied, the resulting q is a Cournot equilib-
1=1 L
rium if and only if the Lagrange multiplier (X) on the constraint is
zero (Figure 1). We then show that X(Q) is a continuous function of Q
and is positive at Q = 0. Thus, if whenever X cuts the horizontal axis,
X'(Q) < 0, we can conclude X cuts the axis at most once. The condition
that X'(Q) < at an equilibrium is precisely eqn. (5). Non-degeneracy
of equilibria implies X is dif f erentiable at any equilibrium. If we
preclude the possibility that X(Q) may be tangent to the horizontal
axis, Theorem 3 can be restated that eqn. (5) is a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium. We now turn
to the proof.
Following Murphy et al. (1982) and Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977),
consider the following mathematical program:
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N
2
N
max g(Q) = ?(Q) E q. + y P'(Q) E q. - E C . ( q . ) (7a)
q i=l
L
i=l
X
i=l
1 X
N
subject to E q. = Q (7b)
i=l L
q. > V. e N (7c)n i — l
for which first order conditions for an optimum are
CP2(Q): I2- = P(Q) + q.P'(Q) - C.'(q.) - X < 0, V. eN (8a)h
N
E q. Q (8b)
I3- q. =0 (8c)3q . 1
q. > V e N (8d)n i — i
If P'(Y+x) < C'.'(x), for all x, Y^ 0, i e N, then g(Q) is concave and
there is a one to one correspondence between solutions to eqn. (7) and
eqn. (8). The complementarity problem CP2(Q) is parameterized by Q and
involves finding q(Q) and X(Q) which satisfies eqn. (8). Note that
CP2(Q) is the same as CP1 with the addition of the constraint (8b). In
the following lemma we show that if Q is chosen so that \ is zero, then
q(Q) which satisfies CP2(Q) satisfies CP1 and vice versa.
Lemma 1 : Assume cost and inverse demand functions are twice continuously
dif ferentiable and P'(Y+x) < C'.'(x)
,
for all x, Y > 0, i e N. If q* is
1
N
a Cournot equilibrium then q* solves CP2(Q*) where Q* = E q* and if
i=l
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Q* > 0, X(Q*) = 0. Conversely, if for some Q the solution to CP2(Q)
results in X(Q) = 0, then q(Q) is unique and is a Cournot equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose q* is a Cournot equilibrium. Then it solves CP1.
N
Clearly, with X = 0, q* also solves CP2(Q*) where Q* = E q*. Further
i = l
if Q* > 0, no other X * will work. If Q* > 0, then there exists a j
such that q* > which implies eqn. (2a) holds strictly for that j,
implying
P(Q*) + q*P'(Q*) - C!(q*) = 0. (9)
J J J
But if q* solves CP2(Q*) and q* > then eqn. (8a) must also hold strictly:
P(Q*) + q*P'(Q*) - C'(q*) - X = 0. (10)
Comparing eqn. (9) and eqn. (10) obviously implies X = 0.
The converse is trivially true. Since P'(Y+x) < C'.'(x), and eqn.
(7b) implies the constraint set is bounded, we know for any Q, there
exists a unique solution to CP2(Q): q(Q) and X(Q). If for some Q,
X(Q) = 0, then eqn. (2) and eqn. (8) are identical.
The next result is an extension of a well known result on the con-
tinuity of the optimal solution of a mathematical program (see Fiacco
and McCormick, 1968; Hogan, 1973). The following lemma is proved by
Murphy et al. (1982), among others.
L emma 2 : Assume cost and inverse demand functions are twice continuously
differentiable and P'(Y+x) < C'.'(x), for all x, Y > 0, i e N. Then the
solutions to CP2(Q), q(Q) and X(Q) are continuous functions of Q over
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(0,°°). Furthermore, if strict complementary slackness holds (q. = = >
i
P(Q) < C (0)) then q and X are locally dif f erentiable.
i
We now turn to proofs of the theorems.
Proof of Theorem 1 : Follows directly from result that this concave
game has a Nash equilibrium over a compact set of outputs.
Proof o f Theorem 2 ; We show that eqn. (5) is equivalent to requiring
N
X'(Q*) < for all Cournot equilibria, q*, where Q* = E q*. By Lemma
i=l
2, X(Q) is continuous and, because of non-degeneracy of all equilibria,
X(Q) is locally dif f erentiable at Q*. Thus, if X is always downward
sloping when it cuts the X = axis, there can be at most one Q > for
which X(Q) = 0. From Lemma 1, this implies at most only one nontrivial
N
q for which X( E q.) =0 and thus at most one nontrivial Cournot
1=1
L
equilibrium. We now show that eqn. (5) implies X'(Q*) < 0.
For a particular Q, let q(Q) solve CP2(Q). Define the index set
M(Q) by
M(Q) = (i e N|q.(Q) > 0} (11)
For any Cournot equilibrium, q*, we know that q* = q(Q*) where
N
Q* = E q*. Thus from the assumption that all equilibria are non-
1-1
X
degenerate, we know from Lemma 2 that there is a small neighborhood, A,
about Q* over which M(Q) does not change and over which q(Q) and X(Q)
are continuously dif f erentiable. Thus, over this neighborhood eqn.
(8a) holds as an equality if and only if i e M(Q*):
X(Q) = P(Q) + q.(Q)P'(Q) - C^(q.(Q)), Q e A, i e M(Q*) (12)
-10-
We can thus totally differentiate eqn. (12) with respect to Q to obtain
X'(Q*) = P'(Q*) + q^(Q*)P'(Q*) + q£P"(Q*) - Cj»(q*)q| (Q*)
= P'(Q*) + q*P"(Q*) + [P'CQ*) - C ,
.
, (q*)]q!(Q*) (13)
l l l i
X'(Q*) ?'W + ifp,, <Q*>
=>
A ^ ' = i a'(Q*) (14)
C'.'Cq*) - P'CQ*) C'.'Cq*) - P'(Q*) qi V^ ' K '
Eqn. (14) can be summed over all elements of M noting that
£ iJ<Q*) =d^ [ E q i (Q * )] = df* lQ * ] = L (l5)jeM ^ jeM v
since the index set M remains unchanged over the neighborhood A. Thus,
summing eqn. ( 14)
:
P'(Q*) + q*P"(Q*)
X
' (Q*\ E C'.'Cq*) " P'CQ*) = \ C"(q*) - P'CQ*) " L " (16)J^ ] J ieM j ^j
By assumption v) , C'.'Cq*) - P'CQ*) > 0. Thus \'(Q*) has the same sign
as the right-hand side of eqn. (15), which by assumption is negative.
Proof of Theorem 3 : Sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the
equilibrium are trivial application of Theorem 1. We thus focus on the
necessary conditions for uniqueness.
Suppose there is a unique nontrivial Cournot equilibrium, q*, but
that at q*, the left-hand side of eqn. (5) is strictly greater than the
right-hand side. We will construct another nontrivial equilibrium, thus
proving necessity by contradiction.
-11-
Frora assumption iv) , there is a j such that P(0) > C!(0). Continuity
of P, P' and C implies that there is a positive Q < E qf such that
J
J"
sN
P(Q) - q.P'(Q) - C.'(q.) > for all q. _< Q. Let q . (Q) and X(Q) solve
CP2(Q). From eqn. (7a), we know
P(Q) + q.P'(Q) " C.*(q.) - X(Q) < (17)
j J J ~~
which implies X(Q) > 0. By assumption, the left-hand side of eqn. (5)
is greater than the right-hand side at q(Q*). Thus, from the proof of
Theorem 2, \'(Q*) > 0. Since X(Q) is dif f erentiable at Q* and continuous
over (0,»), this implies that for some Q, where Q < Q < Q*, A(Q) = 0.
From Lemma 1, this yields another distinct Cournot equilibrium, contra-
dicting our assumption of a unique nontrivial Cournot equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The main result of this paper is Theorem 3. In that theorem we
show the conditions under which a Cournot equilibrium is unique. If
the basic market involves quasi-concave profit function and a few
other weak restrictions are met, the theorem gives necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium.
Eqn. (5) states those conditions. Roughly interpreted (for the case
of identical firms), the condition is that ray marginal revenue func-
tion declines when you increase your output.
-12-
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